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An increasingly important part of contemporary merger control both in the US and the EU is unilateral 
effects analysis, particularly with regard to oligopolistic mergers. In practice, this requires econometric 
analyses of past market data and, above all, the construction of simulation models in order to quantify 
the price effects in each specific case. The review of the merger between the software firms Oracle and 
PeopleSoft in 2003/04 has been the most important instance of parallel application of these 
sophisticated economic tools by the EU and US authorities so far. This makes an in-depth study of the 
case going from the controversial issue of market definition to the specificities of the competitive 
assessment worthwhile. Therefore, we highlight certain similarities as well as (minor) differences 
between the EU and US proceedings. Interestingly, despite serious initial concerns the transaction was 
not blocked nor even required to be modified in the any of the two jurisdictions. We derive a number 
of interesting insights and, in particular, point out problems and lessons associated with the use of 
sophisticated economic tools in contemporary merger control. In addition to case-specific factors, the 
major insights encompass the continued relevance of market definition, the need to accompany 
predictive economic evidence with compatible reasoning and the benefits of including the economics 
of dynamic and evolutionary competition. 
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1. Introduction 
Sophisticated economic tools are used in contemporary merger control to an increasing extent 
on both sides of the Atlantic. A particularly important area is represented by unilateral effects 
analysis, which is based on theoretical insights from industrial economics on welfare-
decreasing effects of oligopolistic mergers.
1 While it was already incorporated in the US 
authorities’ Merger Guidelines with the fundamental 1992 revision, it only recently entered 
EU Merger Control after a controversial debate on the existence of a respective gap under the 
old Merger Regulation. Against this background of convergence, we look at the software firm 
merger Oracle/PeopleSoft as the most important case of parallel application of this relatively 
new concept so far. Interestingly, however, despite serious initial concerns the transaction was 
not blocked nor even required to be modified in any of the two jurisdictions. This merits an 
in-depth study of the case going from the controversial issue of market definition to the 
specificities of the competitive assessment. We extend the existing literature on this case by 
focusing from a non-partisan perspective on the economic assessment of the merger and, in 
particular, on implications following from the use of sophisticated economic evidence, such 
as simulation models.
2 We highlight certain similarities as well as differences between the EU 
and US proceedings and, in particular, point out certain problems associated with the use of 
sophisticated economic tools in contemporary merger control. In addition to case-specific 
factors these relate to the more fundamental issues of market definition, the principal nature 
of predictive economic evidence as well as the underlying notion of competition. 
The paper is organised as follows. The second part provides a brief overview of the 
underlying theories as well as practical application of unilateral effects analysis by means of 
simulation models. The third part of the paper describes the review of the Oracle/PeopleSoft 
merger going from the controversial issue of market definition to the economic evidence used. 
The fourth part compares the proceedings in the US and the EU and employs 
Oracle/PeopleSoft to illustrate lessons and problems associated with the use of merger 
simulations and predictive economic evidence. Part 5 offers some conclusions. 
                                                 
1 With the term oligopolistic merger, we denote a merger between two or more enterprises, which takes place in 
a market that has the distinctive characteristics of an oligopoly both before and after the merger. Consequently, 
mergers towards single-firm dominance or mergers within polypolistic (or quasi-polypolistic) markets do not 
belong to oligopolistic mergers. The typical scenario is a merger that reduces the number of considerable market 
participants from 5 to 4, or 4 to 3, or sometimes even 3 to 2. In addition, competitors without considerable 
market shares may be active in the relevant market. 
2 See for case descriptions Käseberg (2005), Monopolkommission (2006, paras 620-631), Pflanz (2005) and Ruiz 
Calzado (2005). The use of economic tools is briefly discussed by Bottemann (2006,  91-93), 
Epstein/Rubinfeld (2004,  66-70)  and  Zimmer (2006). Furthermore, participants of the proceedings have 
published their view (Bengtsson 2005; McAfee 2004). 2 
2. Theory and Practice of Unilateral Effects Analysis 
2.1. The Economics of Unilateral Effects 
The analysis of unilateral effects as one type of anticompetitive effect of concentrations was 
incorporated in merger control at a relatively recent date. This was in line with the 
development in economic thinking, which only provided thorough analyses during the 1980s. 
Originally, economic theory as well as practical merger control focused on mergers, (i) which 
created a monopoly or comparable situations (quasi-monopoly), or (ii) which facilitated post-
merger collusive behaviour. To begin with, from an economic perspective, a quasi-monopoly 
exists when the market power of the merged firm allows it to unilaterally raise prices, i.e. 
independent from the reaction of the remaining (fringe) competitors. Absent efficiencies, a 
merger that creates such a discretionary leeway for a market leading enterprise is generally 
deemed to be anticompetitive and welfare-reducing (Farrell/Shapiro 1990; 
Kamien/Zang 1990). Hence, a prohibition is the preferable policy treatment. Correspondingly, 
in EU Merger Control the prohibition criterion of market dominance enshrined in the original 
Merger Regulation from 1989
3 addressed such mergers towards monopolisation or single firm 
dominance (Bishop/Walker 2002, 263-265). The same applies to the “substantial lessening of 
competition” standard applied by the US authorities (DoJ/FTC 2006,  26-27; 
Hovenkamp 1999, 505). 
In addition to this single-firm dominance, economic theory long discovered the potential for 
anticompetitive effects in oligopolies where the remaining market participants do not compete 
with each other but, instead, resort to collusive behaviour, even without explicit agreements, 
in order to maximise joint profits. Oligopoly theory has found that such coordinated effects 
require specific characteristics of the relevant market(s) and firms in order to become a 
plausible consequence of an oligopolistic merger.
4 In line with these findings, the European 
Commission has created the concept of collective dominance to capture these effects in 
merger control (e.g. Bishop/Walker 2002,  271-288;  Briones Alonso 1993; 
Winckler/Hansen 1993). It, thereby, more or less closely mirrored the already well-established 
                                                 
3 Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings, in: Official Journal L 395, 30.12.1989, pp. 1-12.
4 The seminal contribution was Stigler (1964). See the more recent overviews by Feuerstein (2005), Ivaldi et  al. 
(2003a),  Jacquemin/Slade (1989)  and  Levenstein/Suslow (2006). Put briefly, the probability of coordinated 
effects increases with a decreasing number of competitors, increasing homogeneity of products and cost 
structures, increasing market transparency, increasing barriers to entry, decreasing innovation dynamics, 
increasing record of former collusion, and decreasing probability of detection and sanctions. Furthermore, 
multimarket contacts, experience with coordination in the past and a stable economic environment facilitate 
coordinated behaviour. In theoretical terms, coordinated effects mirror the stabilization problem of cartels in a 
world with anticartel law. 3 
practice of coordinated effects analysis by the US authorities (DoJ/FTC  1997, sec. 2.1; 
DoJ/FTC 2006, 18-25; Hovenkamp 1999, 510-519). 
Starting in the 1980s, new insights from industrial economics have increasingly indicated the 
possibility of a third distinct type of anticompetitive effects from mergers in oligopolies.
5 
There can be a discretionary margin for a merged firm to profitably raise prices unilaterally 
even though it is not dominating its market post-merger but, instead, remains ‘only’ one 
among few oligopolists. Consequently, oligopolistic mergers may well have anticompetitive 
effects other than coordinated post-merger interaction. In order to clarify things, these two 
effects must be differentiated carefully. A good starting point is the delineation by Willig 
(1991, 292): “Unilateral effects are changes in the actions of the merging firms that would be 
profitable for them as a result of the merger if the nonparties did not alter their actions or the 
nonparties reacted unilaterally themselves. Coordinated effects are changes in the actions of 
the merging firms that would be profitable for them as a result of the merger only if the 
changes are accompanied by alterations in the actions of the nonparties that are motivated in 
part by fears of reprisals” (similarly Bishop/Walker  2002, 287). The decisive difference, 
therefore, lies in the nature of the strategic relationship between the merged firm and its 
remaining competitors.  
The core idea of unilateral effects is that a merger between two competitors (A and B) 
removes one firm (B) as a competitive constraint for the other (A), thus increasing the margin 
for pricing A’s product (and vice versa). Industrial economists have analysed the conditions, 
under which a merger would make such a price increase profitable for the merged company. 
In general, this is more likely in heterogeneous markets, for example where products are 
differentiated in terms of their characteristics or where producers are spatially dispersed so 
that competition is localised in a geographic sense. As a corollary, consumers have 
heterogeneous preferences for the individual suppliers’ goods. More precisely, the decisive 
factor is the closeness of competition between the suppliers or the degree of substitutability 
between their products as opposed to those supplied by other producers. This must be 
                                                 
5 See the overviews by Baker 1999a, 188-191; Bishop/Walker 2002, 265-270; Ivaldi et  al. (2003b); Willig 1991; 
Werden/Froeb 2006. Although quite similar ideas had already been developed by Chamberlin (1933) and 
Robinson (1933), the recent discussion started with the initial contribution by Salant/Switzer/Reynolds (1983), 
demonstrating the impossibility of both profitable and non-collusive price increasing mergers in homogenous 
oligopolies. However, this induced further research demonstrating that anticompetitive unilateral effects are 
possible if products and/or production processes are heterogeneous. See inter alia Baker/Bresnahan 1985; 
Deneckere/Davidson 1985; Perry/Porter 1985; Levy/Reitzes 1992; McAfee/Williams 1992; McAfee/Simons/ 
Williams 1992; Hausman/Leonard/Zona 1994; Werden/Froeb 1994. More recently, this line of research has been 
extended to auction markets. See inter alia the work by Brannman et al. (2000), Dalkir et al. (2000), Tschantz et 
al. (2000), Waehrer (1999) and Waehrer/Perry (2003).4 
calculated for every specific case either in the form of so-called diversion ratios
6, e.g. 
between firms A and B (DAB), or the relevant cross-price elasticities of demand.
7 
Anticompetitive effects can be expected if the relevant figures for the merging firms’ products 
are sufficiently high, implying that, given a price increase, a significant part of the lost sales 
of A would be diverted to the formerly independent product of B. Thus, negative welfare 
effects can occur well below single-firm dominance and even in scenarios where the merged 
entity does not acquire the market-leader position at all. 
Table 1: Illustration of Unilateral Effects (adapted and modified from Bishop/Walker 2002, 
265) 
Firm S0 S1 Diversion Ratio with 
reference to A 
A 100 80  -- 
B 100  115  0.75 
C 250  251  0.05 
D 100  102  0.10 
E 50 52  0.10 
    
AB 200 195  -- 
AD 200 182  -- 
S0 sales at initial prices; S1 sales after A’s hypothetical price increase 
Consider as an illustration table 1. Suppose that in a hypothetical example initially there are 
five competing suppliers in the relevant market (A to E) with C being the market leader and 
accounting for the largest sales volume So at initial prices. A potential merger between the 
second and third largest firm A and B would, therefore, not lead to singe-firm dominance. 
Coordinated effects are not likely either given the heterogeneity of products and consumer 
preferences. However, it could give rise to unilateral effects. In order to assess this possibility, 
one needs to look at the change in sales volume after a hypothetical price increase for A’s 
product. In the hypothetical example, most of the lost costumers of A would be absorbed by 
B, thus yielding an only slightly reduced post-merger sales volume S1 for AB (195) and a 
                                                 
6 The diversion ratio indicates what portion of the reduction in sales of a given product resulting from a price 
increase – other conditions being equal - is absorbed by another product. Expressed as a formula this gives e.g. 














= . The concept goes back to Shapiro (1996). 
7 The cross-price elasticity of demand indicates how strongly the quantity of demand for a given product changes 
in response to changes in the price of another product, assuming that all other conditions remain constant.  5 
high value of the diversion ratio DAB (0.75), which indicates a very intense competitive 
relationship between the two firms’ products. Under such a constellation, a merger between A 
and B would most likely conduct a price increase on A’s product profitable, which is the very 
essence of unilateral effects.
8 Contrariwise, a potential merger between firms A and D would 
probably not give rise to significant unilateral effects for the simple reason that most 
costumers would turn away from the merged entity AD after an increase in the price for A’s 
product. This can clearly be seen from the strongly reduced hypothetical sales volume S1 for 
AD (182) and the low value of the diversion ration DAD (0.10), respectively. 
2.2. Merger Simulation Models and other Types of Economic Evidence 
In practice the assessment whether a particular merger is likely to cause substantial unilateral 
effects makes an in-depth case analysis necessary. In order to accomplish this, a number of 
sophisticated tools have been developed in competition economics during the last decade. The 
two principal types of instruments are simulation models and econometric analysis, which are 
complementary in some respects. In addition to looking at the firms’ closeness of competition 
as described in the preceding section, other aspects of the real-world markets, such as 
potential efficiency gains from the merger or strategic reactions by the competitors, must be 
included in the analysis.  
The most innovative method in accomplishing this is the construction of so-called merger 
simulation models, which have played an important role in the Oracle/PeopleSoft case studied 
below.
9 Advocates of the simulation approach emphasise its superiority to what they call the 
“traditional” or “qualitative” merger analysis focusing on market definition and related 
structural indicators, above all market shares. Their claim is usually based on two 
arguments.
10 Firstly, simulation models are held to be more transparent since the model 
construction requires the exact determination of the underlying assumptions. Secondly, the 
results are held to be more objective and more precise because they are deduced logically 
from the underlying model and are of a quantitative nature. Effectively, simulation models are 
said to provide reliable projections of the price and quantity effects of a given merger at least 
                                                 
8 However, in order to establish unilateral effects other factors must be included in the analysis such as potential 
efficiency gains from the merger or repositioning by the competitors (see sec. 2.2). 
9 There is a growing literature on simulation models. The most important contributions include Baker/Rubin-
feld 1999,  414-416;  Capps et al. 2003; Dubow  et  al. 2004;  Epstein/Rubinfeld 2001;  Epstein/Rubinfeld 2004; 
Kokkoris 2005; Walker 2005; Weiskopf 2003; Werden 2005; Werden/Froeb 2006; Werden et al. 2004. 
10 For example, Werden (2005, 43) postulates: “Merger simulation thereby replaces subjective and unverifiable 
surmise with objective and verifiable calculation.” 6 
for the short term. In principle, this relates quite well to the limited time horizon of 
assessments in merger control, which usually encompasses two to three years.
11
Weiskopf (2003, 57) characterizes merger simulation as “an approach for predicting post-
merger prices using information about pre-merger market conditions, while building on 
assumptions about the behaviour of firms and consumers”. In more detail, the model 
construction consists of several steps. To begin with a decision must be made on the basic 
functional (mathematical) form. Available alternatives include the Antitrust Logit Model 
(ALM), possibly in a nested version, the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) and various 
kinds of auction models. Then, the model parameters must be specified. In differentiated 
goods markets, this concerns the precise nature of competition, the customer preferences and 
the firms’ cost structure. More specifically, the form or structure of the given market and the 
primary competitive parameters must be determined (price, quantity, capacity).
12 The most 
common choice here is the Bertrand model for price competition in differentiated products 
markets with the degree of substitutability between the different products being incorporated 
by means of the abovementioned diversion ratios or cross-price elasticities. Market shares 
generally represent a less adequate source of information in this regard. Finally, merger-
related cost changes such as expected efficiency gains and the likely reaction of competitors 
to the merger need to be incorporated. Merger-related efficiency gains are subject to an 
intense separate debate in theoretical as well as empirical industrial organization, which 
shows that they are difficult to predict in individual cases (e.g. Farrell/Shapiro 1990; 
Tichy 2001). Competitor reactions, such as the repositioning of their products or even of the 
actual entry of formerly potential competitors from nearby markets, are equally difficult to 
incorporate as for example the long-term experience with entry analysis in merger control 
both in the EU and the US has shown (e. g. DoJ/FTC 2006, 37-47; Lindsay 2006, 480-499). 
The two principal methods for finding the parameter values are estimation and calibration. 
Estimation means that they can be calculated directly from datasets. For example, demand 
elasticities may be estimated from past market data. By contrast, calibration refers to the 
indirect determination of the parameter values. “A model is calibrated when its parameters are 
quantified from casual empiricism or unrelated econometric studies or are chosen to guarantee 
that the model precisely mimics some particular feature of the historical data” (Hoover 1995, 
                                                 
11 In the EU the general practice of the Commission is to focus on the merger effects over the next two to three 
years (Lindsay 2006, 76-78). In the US, the agencies employ a comparable time horizon. For example, the 
relevant period for the consideration of entry is two years (DoJ/FTC 2006, 45-46; Hovenkamp 1999, 534-536). 
12 Price competition is also known as Bertrand behaviour, whereas competition in quantities is referred to as 
Cournot behaviour. Possible complications include the modelling of sequential decision-making à la Stackelberg 
(e.g.  Huck et al. 2001) and of dynamic changes in reaction patterns in conjectural-variation models (e.g. 
Kolstad/Wolak 1986; Pfaffermayr 1999). 7 
25).
13 Things are slightly different with regard to auction or bidding markets (DoJ/FTC 2006, 
31-34; Van Dijk 2005, 88-94). The simulation model must then reflect the characteristics of 
the procurement process such as the number of stages involved. However, parameter 
specification is facilitated by the fact that information on the (distribution of) winning and 
losing bids and on the participants therein is usually sufficient.  
The possibility of estimating the parameter values already refers to another method of 
assessing unilateral effects in individual real-world cases, namely the use of econometric 
methods such as multiple regression analysis (e.  g. Baker/Rubinfeld 1999,  406-414; 
Bishop/Walker  2002, 327-377). The objective here is to identify the structure of the 
competitive interrelations from past market data. In standard differentiated goods markets, 
this may involve the estimation of the abovementioned diversion ratios and cross-price 
elasticities or other indicators of the intensity of competition. The analysis again differs 
considerably if buyers conduct auctions to select suppliers and determine transaction prices 
(Baker/Rubinfeld 1999, 416-421; Bishop/Walker 2002, 432-441; Dalkir et al. 2000). There, 
the focus can be on the number and, particularly, the identity of the bidding suppliers and 
whether they influence the bidding behaviour. Most importantly, the significance of market 
share figures is much smaller. The ability of a certain firm to submit a credible bid is much 
more important than the actual share of won bids in the past.  
2.3. Application, Cases, and Guidelines 
Against this background of theoretical insights and practical tools developed by competition 
economics, the competition authorities in the US and the EU have made increasing use of 
unilateral effects analysis in recent years. The US antitrust agencies were the first to adopt this 
line of thought in their 1992 revision of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (HMG).
14 As a 
result, it is now regarded as one of the most important developments in the so-called "Post-
Chicago Antitrust" (e.g. Hovenkamp 2001, 332). In detail, section 2.2 of the US HMG is 
entirely devoted to the “lessening of competition through unilateral effects” (DoJ/FTC 1997). 
The agencies therein deal with two principal cases, namely markets where firms offer 
differentiated products and such where they are distinguished primarily by their capacities. 
For both scenarios, the Guidelines state a combined market share of at least 35 per cent as a 
typical prerequisite for considerable unilateral effects. 
The US authorities have also gathered a fair amount of case practice with unilateral effects 
(DoJ/FTC 2006, 25-36). One prominent case of application was the proposed combination of 
                                                 
13 Hoover’s article deals particularly with quantitative macroeconomics, where similar problems regarding model 
specification are discussed. 
14 See inter alia Shapiro 1996; Starek/Stockum 1995; Baker 2003; Denis 1993, 513-515. 8 
the babyfood producers Heinz and Beech-Nut in 2000/01, which was a 3-to-2-merger with 
Gerber being the market leader (Baker 2004; Leary 2001). Although the merging firms did 
not challenge Gerber’s leading position, the merger was successfully challenged in court by 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Another landmark case from the FTC’s practice was 
the proposed office superstore merger between Staples and Office Depot in 1996/97 
(Baker 1999b; Dalkir/Warren-Boulton 2004). The FTC relied predominantly on econometric 
analyses, which demonstrated that the presence of the merging firms significantly constrained 
each other’s pricing behaviour in local markets (e. g. Baker 1999b). An important early case 
of the DoJ was the combination of the two leading producers of consumer paper products 
Kimberly and Clark–Scott in 1995.
15 By estimating the relevant demand elasticities using 
scanner data the DoJ found considerable potential for significant price increases and, 
therefore, negotiated a consent decree requiring the divestiture of assets concerning certain 
product types. In Vail Resorts–Ralston Resorts, the DoJ in 1997 intervened against the merger 
between the two largest owner-operators of ski resorts in Colorado.
16 It used a Bertrand 
merger simulation model, which demonstrated the likelihood of a significant post-merger 
increase in lift-ticket prices at the acquiring firm’s resorts. The merger simulation also 
indicated that divestiture of Ralston’s Arapahoe Basin resort would substantially prevent price 
increases. Consequently, that remedy was eventually implemented through a consent decree. 
In regard to EU Merger Control, with the reform process from 2002 onwards, a controversy 
started whether unilateral effects in oligopolies were covered by the market dominance test or 
whether there was a gap in the ‘old’ Merger Regulation, i.e. some types of anticompetitive 
mergers could not be challenged because neither single-firm nor collective market dominance 
was involved.
17 In the course of the establishment of the so-called more-economic approach, 
unilateral effects analysis along with efficiency defence elements was explicitly introduced 
into EU Merger Control, firstly manifesting in the switch from the market dominance concept 
to the broader and more general prohibition criterion of “Significant Impediment to Effective 
Competition” (SIEC), secondly in the newly issued EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
(European Commission 2004; see also Voigt/Schmidt 2004). However, a closer look at the 
case-law reveals that the Commission had already examined unilateral price effects in narrow 
oligopolistic markets prior to the reform, and, thereby, also resorted to econometric methods 
in some cases, primarily relating to bidding markets (Van Dijk 2005, 94-96). A fitting 
                                                 
15 United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp. and Scott Paper Co., available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/kimber0.htm. 
16 United States and the State of Colorado v. Vail Resorts, Inc., Ralston Resorts, Inc., and Ralston Foods, Inc., 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/vailre0.htm. 
17 See e.g. Vickers 2004;  Völcker 2004;  Ehlermann et al. 2005; Baxter/Dethmers 2005; Fingleton 2003; 
Christiansen 2006, 22-24. 9 
example is the General Electric/Instrumentarium case in 2003
18, which involved 
manufacturers of certain types of medical equipment (also Bishop/Lofaro 2005; 
Blumenthal 2005, 3-4; Bottemann  2006, 94-95). Other earlier examples include the cases 
Philips/Agilent
19 and Philips/Marconi Medical Systems
20, both from 2001, which also 
concerned certain healthcare markets (also Bishop/Walker  2002, 439), and Philip 
Morris/Papastratos
21 from 2003, which affected the Greek cigarette market (also 
Lindsay 2006, 277 and 544). In the latter case, the Commission accepted a simulation model 
submitted by the parties in order to disprove any potential for price increases. Finally, in the 
Lagardère/Natexis/VUP
22 case (2004; concerning markets related to French-language book 
publishing), the Commission relied inter alia on a simulation model in order to establish the 
potential for post-merger price increases (also Ivaldi 2005; Lindsay 2006, 544). Eventually, 
Lagardère sold a substantial part of the acquired business so that the transaction could be 
cleared. 
Taken together, competition economics nowadays provides a number of sophisticated tools 
for analysing unilateral effects in real-world markets, which are frequently applied by the EU 
and the US authorities. However, the injection of econometric evidence and, in particular, 
simulation models in merger control procedures causes a number of new problems with which 
both antitrust authorities and courts as well as merging enterprises have to deal. The Oracle 
PeopleSoft case represents an outstanding example in this regard. In the US, it was the first 
time that a full-blown merger simulation model has been discussed in the courtroom 
(Bottemann 2006, 91; Werden 2005, 46), while in the EU it represents the first instance that 
the Commission economists developed a simulation model in-house.
23 From a detailed 
analysis of this landmark case, important lessons on the use of economic inputs in merger 
control can be learned. 
3. An In-depth Study of the Oracle/PeopleSoft Case 
3.1. The Concentration at Issue 
The Oracle/PeopleSoft case resulted from the hostile bid by the US software company Oracle 
for its US rival PeopleSoft in June 2003. Moreover, in July 2003 PeopleSoft itself completed 
                                                 
18 Case No COMP/M.3083 - GE/Instrumentarium, in: Official Journal L 109, 16/04/2004, pp. 1-63. 
19 Case No COMP/M.2256 - Philips/Agilent Health Care Solutions, in: Official Journal C 292, 18/10/2001, pp. 1-
10.
20 Case No COMP/M.2537 - Philips/Marconi Medical Systems, in: Official Journal C 321, 16/11/2001 p. 12.
21 Case No COMP/M.3191 - Philip Morris/Papastratos, in: Official Journal C 258, 28/10/2003, p. 4. 
22 Case No COMP/M.2978 - Lagardère/Natexis/VUP, in: Official Journal L 125, 28/04/2004, pp. 54-60. 
23 In a few earlier cases, the Commission had simulation studies prepared by external experts such as by Ivaldi/ 
Verboven (2001) on the Volvo/Scania case in 2001 and by Ivaldi (2005) on the Lagardère/Natexis/VUP case in 
2004. 10 
the takeover of JD Edwards, another smaller competitor. These transactions affected a part of 
the market for business software, namely that for enterprise application software (EAS) (EU, 
paras 15-54; US, pp. 2-16).
  24 Put briefly, EAS serves to facilitate the management of large 
business or other organisations at the corporate or branch level. Functions include the 
management of corporate finances, customer relations or project resources. EAS is typically 
sold in integrated packages (“suites”) covering several functionalities, while individual sales 
limited to certain sub-functions also occur. The products are differentiated in terms of 
functionality. Transactions typically are done on an individual basis and are organised by the 
corporate customers as a competitive bidding process involving several steps. Accordingly, 
pricing is described as “a deal-and-customer-driven process” with discounts of up to 90% 
compared to the initial list price being possible. Beside the initial licence, subsequent 
maintenance and support including bug-fixing or product updates are contracted as well and 
priced separately in the form of annuities in the order of around 20% of effective licence 
price. Taken together, markets exhibit a high degree of price discrimination 
Oracle and PeopleSoft were the second and third largest vendor of EAS worldwide behind the 
German firm SAP. Therefore, the takeover was subject to intensive review by the US DoJ and 
the European Commission, which argued along broadly similar lines. Both the DoJ and the 
Commission originally expected serious anticompetitive effects and intended to prohibit the 
merger. Due to the respective institutional setting this took different procedures despite 
substantial agreement (Venit/Kolasky 2000). The DoJ had to bring the case to court and, 
hence, filed suit before Judge Vaughn Walker of the District Court of Northern California on 
26 February 2004. In the accompanying press release it boldly stated that “the result of this 
merger would be higher prices, less innovation, and fewer choices” (DoJ 2004a). In the solely 
administrative process in the EU, the Commission opened an in-depth investigation  and 
expressed its intention to prohibit the transaction in its Statement of Objections on 12 March 
2004
25 based on a similar expectation of anticompetitive effects. Yet, the US Court refused to 
grant an injunction on 9 September 2004 and the DoJ announced its reluctance to appeal on 1 
October 2004. Shortly afterwards, the Commission granted unconditional clearance to the 
transaction on 26 October 2004. 
                                                 
24 For reasons of brevity the District Court for the Northern District of California’s Judgement from 09/09/2004 
is referred to as ‘US’ throughout this article, while the final decision by the European Commission of 26/10/2004 
is cited as ‘EU‘. The official documents are available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f205300/205388.pdf and 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m3216_en.pdf, respectively. 
25 The Statement of Objections itself is not publicly available, but it is referred to several times in the final 
decision (e.g. EU, paras 4, 21, 55, 125, 146, 162, 187, 188, 197). 11 
3.2. The Controversy over Market Definition 
Both authorities conducted a detailed analysis regarding the precise definition of the relevant 
market, which was contested by Oracle. This had profound consequences for the following 
analysis of the competitive impact of the transaction as well.
26  
3.2.1. DoJ versus Oracle in the US Trial 
In addition to presenting an impressive number of witnesses (among them ten customer 
witnesses as well as five industry witnesses
27), the DoJ distinctly relied on the market 
definition by its economic expert Kenneth Elzinga from the University of Virginia. In terms 
of the product dimension, Elzinga advocated a separation of the EAS market in horizontal and 
vertical respects relying on a set of product, customer and performance characteristics (US, 
48-103). The consequent relevant market was the high function FMS and HRM market, 
which comprised the licensing and maintenance of integrated suites for Human Resources 
Management (HRM) and Financial Management Systems (FMS) sold to “large complex 
enterprises”.  Elzinga cited several sources to substantiate these claims, namely so-called 
discount approval forms (DAFs)
28, a report on the HRM market by Gartner Research, 
information from customers and consulting firms and internal documents from firms in the 
sector. Of them, the analysis and tabulation of more than 200 DAFs from Oracle had the 
greatest weight. They showed that the presence of PeopleSoft and SAP (122 and 81 times, 
respectively) served as the primary justification for extraordinary discounts, while smaller 
competitors were of much les significance (16 times for Lawson and less than 10 times each 
for Microsoft and AMS). 
In geographical terms, the DoJ and Elzinga claimed the relevant market to be limited to the 
United States (US, 131-134). The main justification was the purportedly “local” and on-going 
relationship between the vendor and the consumer. Elzinga also presented market shares and 
HHI numbers calculated on the basis of confidential sales data obtained by the DoJ (US, 101-
102). He applied a minimum threshold purchase of $500,000 per customer to identify high 
function FMS and HRM. The market share figures are included in table 2. The calculated pre-
merger HHI in the high function FMS market was 2800, which would increase to 3800 post-
merger. Regarding the high function HRM market, an initial HHI value of 2800 and a post-
                                                 
26 The discussion on market definition is better documented in the US trial, while more material is available on 
the analysis of possible anticompetitive effects by the European Commission. The following exposition reflects 
this imbalance. 
27 Interestingly, these included Philip Wilmington and Richard Bergquist, both high executive officers of 
PeopleSoft, which opposed the takeover, as well as Richard Allen, formerly at JD Edwards, and Douglas 
Burgum of Microsoft Business Solutions. 
28 Discount approval forms (DAFs) must be filled in by the firms’ salespersons and approved by an official, if 
the discount to be offered in a certain procurement process exceeds their range of discretion, e.g. 20 to 25 
percent in the case of Oracle (US, 96). 12 
merger value of 5700 were calculated. All these findings suggested a massive increase in 
concentration and represented a major reason for the DoJ to intervene against the merger. 
Table 2: Different Market Share Calculations in the US Trial (Source: US, 102, 137/138) 
 DoJ/Elzinga Oracle 
Company 
US high-function 







PeopleSoft  31 50 12  11.3 
Oracle 17  18  16.8  3.1 
Oracle/PeopleSoft 
combined 
48  68  28.8  14.3 
SAP 39  30  19.2  11.9 
 
During the trial, Oracle contested the market definition by the DoJ in a very detailed manner 
(US, 103-124). Oracle also presented a number of industry and other witnesses.
29 Of the 
greatest importance were, however, the testimonies of the two economic experts Jerry 
Hausman from MIT and Thomas Campbell from UC Berkeley. They argued that the applied 
criteria were inconsistent and too imprecise to justify the vertical separation of the market. 
More specifically, they would lead to the erroneous exclusion of certain large transactions 
from the high-function markets.
30 Moreover, inter alia mid-market vendors and incumbent 
systems had to be included in the product market as viable substitutes. In terms of geographic 
scope, they argued for worldwide markets relying inter alia on the product characteristics, the 
location of the market leader SAP in Germany and the empirical observation that prices in 
Europe constrained prices in the US, and vice versa (US, 134-138). Oracle also provided own 
market share calculations with significantly lower figures both for the merged entity and SAP 
and, consequently, made the merger appear less anticompetitive. Table 2 compares the figures 
submitted by the parties. 
The Court then found fault with the DoJ’s market definition in several respects and, thus, 
largely followed Oracle (US, 124-130; 138-141). It criticised the evidence submitted by the 
DoJ as “circumstantial and highly qualitative“ and pointed out “several shortcomings”. 
Especially the lack of quantitative evidence was decisive: “But the court cannot delineate 
product boundaries in multi-billion dollar merger suits based upon the mere notion that there 
is ‘something different’ about the merging products and all others, especially when that 
                                                 
29 These included Richard Knowles of SAP America and Jay Coughlan of Lawson Software. 
30 For example, Hausman pointed to the exclusion of the large nationwide insurance company ManuLife as well 
as firms Johnson & Johnson and Safeway from the high-function market, although they passed the threshold for 
costumers with high functional needs. The apparent reason was that they bought their EAS from vendors other 
than Oracle, PeopleSoft and SAP (US, 116). 13 
‘something different’ cannot be expressed in terms to make a judgment of the court have 
meaning” (US, 126). More specifically, in product terms the Court held that inter alia 
outsourcing and the use of incumbent software presented viable substitutes for certain 
customers. It also rejected the exclusion of mid-market vendors Lawson, AMS and, in 
particular, Microsoft, which it expected to become „a major competitor for up-market 
business“ in the future (US, 129). Contrary to the DoJ, the Court also found the markets to be 
global in scope. In this context, the Court explicitly cited the rejection of the Elzinga-Hogarty-
Test (by one of its inventors!) as another shortcoming. 
3.2.2. The European Commission’s Struggle to Delineate the Relevant Markets 
The European Commission in turn defined the markets as worldwide in geographic scope and, 
similar to the DoJ, as comprising high-function FMS and HRM solutions for large enterprises 
with complex functional needs in product terms (EU, paras 55-180; also Monopolkommission 
2006, paras 620-628). This was operationalised by certain “proxies”, namely net licence value 
in excess of 1 million € and customer size of at least 10,000 employees or of more than 1 
billion € annual revenues. The Commission named SAP, Oracle and PeopleSoft as main 
suppliers, but it also included Lawson, Intentia, Microsoft and QAD (only FMS) as vendors in 
the relevant markets. Among the other „occasional bidders“, Microsoft received particular 
attention as to its size, developer capacities and future plans for the relevant products. On that 
basis, it was finally held to be a mid-market player, but to be able to serve the needs of some 
large customers and, therefore, to represent a possible competitive restraint on the big players. 
Finally, the Commission also calculated two sets of market shares despite stated difficulties in 
obtaining exact figures (EU, paras 181-186). Table 3 gives the figures derived from an 
industry study by Gartner, which are not confined to the relevant high-function markets, but 
show the total worldwide licences revenues in 2002.  
Table 3: Market Share Figures of the European Commission (Source: EU, para 184)
31
Company FMS  HRM 
Oracle 16%  13.5% 
PeopleSoft 9%  30% 
JD Edwards  3%  2.5% 
Oracle/PeopleSoft/JD Edw. Combined  28%  46% 
SAP 51%  40% 
Lawson 4%  9% 
Intentia 1.5%  1.5% 
                                                 
31 The Commission cites the following source: Gartner, ERP Market Experiences Further Decline: Market 
Statistics, 2002, published 2003. 14 
IFS 0.5%  1% 
QAD 1%  - 
Microsoft 14%  2.5% 
The table above shows Oracle, PeopleSoft (including JD Edwards) and SAP to be the main 
players in both markets. SAP would still clearly lead the market in FMS, whereas a combined 
Oracle/PeopleSoft would take the lead in HRM. A direct comparison with the figures from 
the US trial in table 2 is only possible for the figures presented by Oracle, which are arguably 
based on a comparable market definition. Still, the values differ considerably, thus testifying 
to the difficulty of obtaining correct figures. 
3.3. The Case Assessment on Both Sides of the Atlantic 
Following market definition both authorities expected anticompetitive effects to arise from 
the merger. Although the legal prohibition criteria were different, the theories used by the 
authorities and the arguments put forward were quite similar. Both focused on non-
coordinated or unilateral effects.  
3.3.1. The US Trial before the District Court of Northern California 
In the trial before the US District Court of Northern California, the DoJ primarily argued that 
Oracle and PeopleSoft competed in a “localised” sphere (a “node”) within the US high 
function FMS and HRM market, thus giving rise to the potential for significant unilateral 
effects (US, 142-147). An important point was the exclusion of SAP from this “node” because 
it was deemed to be a weaker competitor being less flexible and having lower reputation in 
the US. The Court, however, rejected the underlying customer and consulting firm 
testimonies as well as that from a SAP representative as being too selective. Instead, it 
pointed at the high market shares of SAP, declaring: “…the most persuasive testimony from 
customers is not what they say in court, but what they do in the market“ (US, 146).  
In addition, the DoJ relied on regression analyses and a simulation model by his expert 
Preston McAfee of the California Institute of Technology (US, 147-151; McAfee 2004). 
Firstly, McAfee analysed data obtained from a survey among Oracle sales representatives. 
Based on a regression with three variables (competitor, net revenue, discount percentage) he 
concluded that the presence of PeopleSoft had a 0.097 effect on the discount given by Oracle, 
i.e. 9.7 percent greater discounts. Using a wider dataset including information from the DAFs 
used by Elzinga, he ran a second regression, which produced a 0.136 effect of PeopleSoft’s 
presence. The Court accepted this as evidence of intensive competition between the two 
firms, while at the time finding it insufficient to establish localised competition between them. 15 
Hence, it called for a more complete analysis including the DAFs by PeopleSoft and SAP. 
Moreover, the Court found a lack of “thorough econometric analysis” such as diversion ratios 
(US, 156). 
Secondly, McAfee constructed a calibrated simulation model in order to estimate the post-
merger price increases. Publicly available information on the specification details of the 
model is, however, somewhat scarce. From the verdict as well as from the transcript of 
McAfee’s testimony, it can be inferred that it was an English auction model in order to 
account for the observed multiple rounds of bidding (US, 150-151; McAfee 2004). The market 
shares calculated by Elzinga were used as a proxy for how often each competitor wins a 
contest. The figures were, however, modified in order to incorporate a category of contests, 
where the customers finally chose not to purchase an integrated EAS package from one of the 
three firms in the model but bought a point solution elsewhere or kept their incumbent system. 
McAfee  assumed two scenarios with figures of 15% respectively 20%. His model  also 
contained an assumption on the degree of competitiveness in the industry prior to the merger. 
In this context, McAfee reportedly introduced a parameter labelled “total value of the product 
that accrues to the buyer” (“buyer accrual” estimates), for which he took a range of values 
between 0.5 and 0.9. The higher this figure, the more competitive is the industry. Finally, 
McAfee decided not to incorporate efficiency gains since he did not expect marginal costs to 
be affected by the merger. On that basis, he expected prices in the high function FMS market 
to increase by anywhere from 5 percent (0.5 accrual variable) to 11 percent (0.9 accrual 
variable). In the high function HRM market, he estimated price increases in the order of 13 to 
30 per cent. 
Taken together, the Court held that convincing evidence of localised competition between 
Oracle and PeopleSoft was lacking. Moreover, it plainly rejected the simulation model 
because of its reliance on ‘flawed’ market share data (US, 151). Only at a very late stage of 
the trial, the DoJ then raised the possibility of coordinated post-merger effects between the 
merged entity and SAP. The Court, however, also dismissed this variant, mainly because of 
the heterogeneity of the products and the lack of price transparency (US, 141-142). Therefore, 
the Court concluded that the DoJ failed to establish that the merger would result in 
anticompetitive effects and declined to issue an injunction against the merger. The Justice 
Department subsequently decided not to appeal the verdict, although an official called it 
“disappointing” (Barnett 2004,  13;  DoJ  2004b). This rendered it irrelevant that the Court 
subsequently rejected Oracle’s efficiency defence as well (US, 158-162). The company 
claimed efficiencies to result from two causes, namely significant cost-savings in many areas 16 
of business and an increase in scale, i.e. customer base. The Court, however, found these 
claims “flawed and unverifiable“. 
3.3.2. The Arguments of the European Commission 
The European Commission, after the initial investigations, found that the transaction would 
lead to non-coordinated effects and, accordingly, issued a sharp Statement of Objections. This 
expectation was based, firstly, on the general finding of a “significant group of customers for 
whom there would essentially be only one supplier left after the transaction” (EU, paras 187-
189). These included those customers, who prefer to run their software on a non-Oracle 
database, those who would like to terminate their relationship with one supplier and those 
who prefer to obtain parts of their software from two different sources. Secondly, the 
Commission relied on a data set and regression analysis submitted by PeopleSoft (EU, para 
197). Based on data about the firm’s discounting behaviour in 101 competitive bidding 
situations, this analysis apparently showed a significant influence of the number of bidders on 
the discount given by PeopleSoft. Thirdly, also at a rather early stage of the proceedings, the 
Commission constructed a calibrated simulation model in order to estimate the effects of the 
merger on prices and consumer welfare (EU, paras 191-196). 
Fortunately, some details of the model were published separately later (Bengtsson 2005). The 
core is a sealed-bid auction model in order to capture the characteristics of the purchase 
processes of EAS. It is further assumed that the specific needs differ between customers with 
only them knowing the relative fit of the offered products. The vendors know the identity of 
their competitors but are uncertain about the relative quality, i.e. the monetary value to the 
customers. This uncertainty is captured by the standard deviation of average quality. As a 
consequence, bid behaviour is based on a calculation of expected profits depending both on 
the price and the probability of winning the contest in question. Costs are ignored in the 
model since they are assumed to be mostly sunk before an individual contest and, thus, 
irrelevant to bidding behaviour. Not only the effects on prices are estimated, but also the 
change in “customer surplus”, i.e. the customers’ monetary gain from the purchase of EAS. 
Thereby, the Commission attempted to quantify the effect of the withdrawal of the PeopleSoft 
product from the market. In order to account for the possibility of efficiency gains, two 
different scenarios were calculated regarding the average quality of the post-merger product 
by Oracle (“optimistic”/”pessimistic”). Three suppliers are included, which are meant to 
resemble SAP, Oracle and PeopleSoft. Eventually, the model was calibrated in order to 
conform to certain stylised facts of the markets in question, namely the industry perception 17 
regarding the product quality of the three suppliers, observed market shares and estimates on 
the frequency of unsuccessful bid contests with no sale taking place finally. 
On that basis, one model was calibrated to resemble the high-function HRM market. Prior to 
the merger, the products of SAP and PeopleSoft were considered equal in quality. The (lower) 
relative quality value for Oracle was then computed from its observed pre-merger market 
share of 12 per cent. The Commission considered the frequency of unsuccessful bid contests 
to be in range of 1 to 10 %, which in turn means that the probability of sale in the pre-merger 
scenario is realistic between 90 and 100%. Finally, efficiency gains in the optimistic scenario 
then mean that the product of Oracle post-merger equals that of SAP in quality. The complete 
results are given in table 4 with the grey shaded area representing the realistic range. 
Generally, a higher degree of quality uncertainty leads to lower prices demanded by the 
vendors. Accordingly, the price increases are greater for lower levels of uncertainty. In the 
concrete case prices are expected to rise by 6.8 % in the pessimistic and 14.1 % in the 
optimistic scenario at the high end of the realistic range of uncertainty. At the low end, they 
are expected to rise by 21.1 % and 25.5 %, respectively. Taking into account the reduction in 
choice as well this leads to losses in customer surplus around 38 % in the pessimistic scenario 
and between 19.2 % and 15.5 % in the optimistic scenario, respectively. All in all, the 
simulation model clearly suggests anticompetitive effects for the market of HRM software 
even with substantial efficiency gains. 
Table 4: Simulation results for HRM software (Source: Bengtsson 2005, 144) 
Uncertainty (st.dev.)  0.1 0.2 0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6 1 
Relative quality of Oracle  0.886 0.772 0.658 0.5475 0.45  0.3635 0.05 
Market share of Oracle (%)  12.0 12.0 12.0  12.0  12.0  12.0 12.1 
Effects on price (%) 
Pessimistic  48.6 48.5 39.4  21.1  11.3  6.8 1.5 
Optimistic  37.5 37.5 35.7  25.5  17.9  14.1 9.0 
Probability of sale (%)  100 100 100 99.5  97.2  93.7 80.5 
Effect on customer surplus (%) 
Pessimistic  -12.1 -26.2 -37.8  -39.0  -38.2  -37.8 -38.1
Optimistic  -5.5 -12.0  -18.6 -19.2  -17.0  -15.5 -13.518 
The results were equally clear-cut for the specification resembling FMS and, in fact, showed 
detrimental effects of an even greater extent. The entire results are listed in table 5. This time, 
the Commission firstly used for calibration the stylised fact that SAP offers a superior product 
quality than the other two producers, whose products are of equal quality. The results for a 
standard deviation equal to one could, therefore, not be calculated since this would have 
required negative qualities for both Oracle and PeopleSoft. Secondly, the pre-merger market 
shares of Oracle and PeopleSoft were taken to be roughly equal around 15 % each. The 
optimistic scenario as regards efficiencies here means a 10 % improvement in quality for 
Oracle’s post-merger product due to merger-related synergies. Again judging from the pre-
merger probability of sale the range of realistic results this time covers standard deviations 
between 0.3 and 0.5, which again represent the grey shaded columns three to five in table 5. 
Accordingly, the expected price increases ranged from 13.9 % to almost 30 %, while the loss 
in customer surplus amounted to 17.9 % - 25.2 %. Taken together, the simulation results 
clearly indicate anticompetitive effects for the FMS market, which are not outweighed by 
efficiency gains. 
Table 5: Simulation results for FMS (Source: Bengtsson 2005, 146) 
Uncertainty (st.dev.)  0.1 0.2 0.3  0.4  0.5 0.6  1 
Relative quality of Oracle and 
PeopleSoft 
0.842 0.685 0.528 0.405  0.308 0.217  n.  a. 
Market share of Oracle and 
PeopleSoft (%) 
15.0 15.1 15.0  15.0  15.0 15.0   
Effects on price (%) 
Pessimistic  41.9 41.9 29.9  18.5  14.3 12.1   
Optimistic  27.3 34.8 28.0  17.8  13.9 11.9   
Probability of sale (%)  100 100  99.72 95.88  89.64 83.51   
Effect on customer surplus (%) 
Pessimistic  -8.1 -19.3  -25.2  -21.4  -19.2 -18.1   
Optimistic  -5.5 -12.0  -18.6  -19.2  -17.0 -15.5   
During the further course of the proceedings, however, the Commission backed away from 
these initial findings. On the one hand, the initial market definition turned out to be too 
narrow, especially with regard to the number of relevant suppliers. Hence, the Commission 
refrained from basing its final decision on the described simulation results (EU, para 196). 19 
Moreover, the regression analysis of PeopleSoft’s discounting was later discarded as “rather 
crude and simplified” and “based on a somewhat limited number of bids“ (EU, para 197). On 
the other hand, new evidence became available in a later phase of the proceedings, above all 
data by Oracle on its bidding behaviour (EU, paras 137-144; 198-205). The first dataset 
covered 728 bids from the period 2001-2003. Two more datasets stemmed from the US 
proceedings and were derived from Oracle’s internal discount approval forms and its North 
American Sales Representative Survey. None of the analyses showed a distinctive influence 
of the identity or the number of the bidders. Especially once the size of the deal was included 
as a variable, the number of bidders had no more explanatory power on the level of discounts 
granted. Taken together, this apparently convinced the Commission that it could not 
sufficiently prove unilateral effects. Like the US Court, it also rejected the finding of 
coordinated effects (EU, paras 206-214). The main reasons were the difficulty of reaching a 
common understanding as regards the terms of coordination, asymmetry in market shares, 
heterogeneity of products and reduced market transparency. 
With regard to the EU proceedings, additional case-specific factors may have been relevant at 
the time the decision was reached (Ruiz Calzado  2005). Firstly, the failure of the DoJ to 
successfully challenge the merger before the court may have influenced the Commission to 
clear the case (Fox 2005, 586-587). Secondly, the “gap” discussion with regard to the old 
Merger Regulation, under which Oracle-PeopleSoft was notified, may have played a role.
32 
Thirdly, the Commission possibly wanted to avoid another defeat before the Court of First 
Instance in the face of the previously lost high-profile cases Tetra Laval-Sidel, Airtours-First 
Choice and Schneider-Legrand (see also Stroux 2002; Temple Lang 2003).
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4. Discussion and Reflections 
4.1. Comparison of Market Definition and Competitive Assessments 
The course and the final outcome of the proceedings in the US and in the EU show a number 
of fundamental similarities. The merger initially raised serious concerns by both competition 
authorities. To begin with, both authorities based their concerns on a relatively narrow 
product market definition (horizontal and vertical division of the EAS market; see sec. 3.2). 
Restricting the market to certain high-function software packages sold to large customers 
made the case appear as a 3-to-2 merger with SAP and the combined Oracle/PeopleSoft being 
the relevant suppliers. In both cases, however, this market definition came under attack in the 
                                                 
32 Some indication can be found in EU, para 187. 
33 Case T-342/99 – Airtours v Commission, 06/06/2002; Case T-310/01 - Schneider Electric v Commission, 
22/10/2002; Case T-5/02 – Tetra Laval v Commission, 25/10/2002. 20 
course of the proceedings. The complete exclusion of smaller suppliers such as Lawson and 
Microsoft turned out to be a particularly vulnerable point. However, particularly regarding the 
EU case, the question arises why the simulation model has not been extended once it was 
realised that more competitors (though at present significantly smaller ones) had to be taken 
into accounted. Botteman (2006, 96, footnote 95) reports that “(…) Claas Bengtsson, the 
economist from the Office of the Chief Economist who acted in this case, explained that the 
integration of additional players into the model no longer resulted in consistent – across the 
board – price increases.” If it is true that an extended simulation model inevitably produced 
inconclusive results (i.e. price increases are still forecasted for the majority of scenarios but 
not throughout all scenarios) due to the increased complexity, then the simulation method did 
not suffice in providing unambiguous evidence, and, thus, did not contribute to overcome the 
shortcomings of qualitative assessments.  
Concerning the features of the employed simulations models, the US and the EU model differ 
in regard to their respective specification details. In terms of the auction mechanism, McAfee 
used an English auction model (also ascending bid, oral or open auction). One key point is the 
assumption of complete information, since the bidders are aware of each other and bids are 
announced publicly. Moreover, as stated in his testimony, McAfee assumed the bidders to 
know the buyers’ valuation of their own and the others’ products. By contrast, the 
Commission opted for a (presumably first-price) sealed bid auction model. Therein, each 
bidder is assumed to independently submit a single bid, without seeing the other bids. Further 
information asymmetries were assumed with the value of the product being private 
knowledge of the customers. In addition, the economists relied on differing market definitions 
and hence on different market statistics to calibrate their models.
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Table 6: Comparison of Selected Simulation Results 
Expected price increase in 
market  McAfee  European Commission
1
High Function FMS  5 – 11 per cent  6.8 - 21.1 per cent 
High Function HRM  13 – 30 per cent  14.3 - 29.9 per cent 
1 For reasons of comparability the figures relate to the pessimistic scenario without efficiencies. 
Both models, however, employ rather basic auction mechanisms given the variety of models 
currently available (e.g. Klemperer 2004). Despite the differences, the simulation results for 
comparable settings yield quite similar figures in terms of expected price increases as table 6 
                                                 
34 Unfortunately, the concrete figures used are not published comprehensively so that a direct comparison is 
impossible. 21 
demonstrates.
35 Prima facie this adds force to the expectation of higher post-merger prices 
since it indicates a certain robustness of the findings. This can, firstly, be qualified by a look 
at the theoretical and empirical work in economics on auctions. On a general level, Vickrey 
(1961) established the “revenue equivalence theorem”, which states that under certain 
conditions sealed-bid and open auctions yield equivalent results. There is also some empirical 
support for this proposition e.g. from US timber auctions (e. g. Hansen 1986). Secondly, the 
work on (unilateral) merger effects in auction markets
36 is also relevant here. Tschantz et al. 
(2000) demonstrate the similarity of effects under different auction settings. This finding in 
turn serves to confirm the technical quality of both simulation models used in the 
Oracle/PeopleSoft case. Moreover, Tschantz et al. (2000) establish the degree of symmetry 
between the merging and the non-merging firms as a crucial conditional factor. This helps to 
explain the uniform finding of larger expected price increases in the HRM market, where the 
merged entity would achieve a market position comparable to that of the remaining 
competitor SAP. Thus, judging from the general work on auctions in economics, the pattern 
of results of the studies used in Oracle/PeopleSoft seems plausible. 
In summary, the independently created and differently specified merger simulation models of 
the US and the EU both produced clear and plausible results: the merger was forecasted to be 
price increasing and customer welfare reducing. Yet, despite the unambiguous result of the 
economic instruments, the DoJ failed to prove its case in the courtroom and the Commission, 
after initially submitting a sharp Statement of Objections, finally cleared the merger without 
significant conditions or remedies - a rather rare event in EU Merger Control. Nevertheless, 
both the US Court and the European Commission explicitly endorse the usefulness of 
simulation models for the impact assessment of mergers (US, 45; EU, para 195).
37 
Accordingly, a stronger use of this method in the future can be expected. Hence, it is 
worthwhile to analyse the lessons from the failure of the two best-equipped antitrust 
authorities in the world in order to prove the anticompetitive effects of the Oracle/PeopleSoft 
merger by using merger simulation models and to inquire whether there are systematic 
problems associated with sophisticated economic evidence. The latter would hint to reform 
                                                 
35 Comparable settings here refers to the range of the parameters figures in the EU model, which were 
characterised as realistic above. i.e. where the probability of sale lies between 90% and 100%. 
36 See fn. 5 above. 
37 For instance, the European Commission wrote: “The Commission therefore maintains as a general point that 
this kind of simulation model can be a useful tool in assisting the Commission in making the economic 
assessment of the likely impact of a merger” (EU, para 195). 22 
pressure in merger policy in order to avoid cumulating erroneous permissions of 
anticompetitive mergers (“false positives”).
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4.2. Lessons from and Problems beyond Oracle 
4.2.1. Market Definition Does Matter! 
A lesson from Oracle/PeopleSoft is that, despite contrary claims, market definition does 
matter in unilateral effects cases with merger simulation models. The controversy over the 
adequate market delineation and the subsequent derivation of market shares represented a 
decisive element in the respective merger control proceedings. To some extent, the initial 
analysis of the DoJ (as well as the initial stance of the Commission) was indeed problematic. 
Irrespective of the adequacy of separating so-called high-function markets, the exclusion of 
all competitors except for SAP, Oracle and PeopleSoft seems to be factually controversial and 
at least with regard to potential competition inadequate (Microsoft as a ‘small’ but financially 
powerful competitor with shining prospects in the market). 
However, from a theoretical perspective, market delineation problems should generally not be 
important in unilateral effects analysis with differentiated products since the market 
delineation becomes somewhat endogenous (e.g. Walker 2005, 476-477; Werden 2005, 45). 
In heterogeneous oligopolies, the competitive distance between the market participants differs 
and, since merely oligopolistic mergers of oligopolists supplying comparably close substitutes 
are relevant, the outside border of the relevant market (i.e. the oligopolists with the lowest 
cross-price elasticity to the overtaking enterprise, which, yet, is just high enough to be 
considered within the market) is not so decisive. In Oracle-PeopleSoft, the US Court 
explicitly assessed it to be a considerable advantage of unilateral effects analysis by merger 
simulation models that they may replace the ambiguous task of delineating the relevant 
markets.
40  
However, the necessity to calibrate simulation models with the current market situation 
actually requires (i) to identify all relevant competitors and (ii) deriving their accurate market 
                                                 
38 A type I error is said to occur, if a merger with negative welfare effects is wrongly allowed ("false positive"), 
whereas a type II error denotes an erroneous prohibition of a merger, which would have increased welfare ("false 
negative"). The terms are, however, used inconsistently in the literature. We follow Polinsky/Shavell (1989). 
39 However, there might be a rather simple alternative explanation for the outcome of the Oracle-PeopleSoft case 
that cannot be neglected: the merger was procompetitive and both the US and the EU authorities, the two best 
equipped antitrust authorities in the world, initially produced flawed competitive assessments of the case (thus, a 
prohibition would have represented a type II-error or “false negative”). We do not want to evaluate how likely 
this is. If this was indeed true, however, our question would alter to: why did the use of sophisticated quantitative 
economic techniques led the agencies to a wrong assessment in the first place? This is especially relevant since 
the Oracle/PeopleSoft case reportedly took up a substantial part of the enforcement resources of the authorities 
(e.g. Barnett 2004, 12-13). 
40 “Merger simulation models may allow more precise estimations of likely competitive effects and eliminate the 
need to, or lessen the impact of, the arbitrariness inherent in defining the relevant markets” (US, 45). 23 
shares. In practice, the ‘inherently arbitrary’ task of delineating the relevant markets cannot 
automatically be avoided by the implementation of merger simulation models. Ironically, the 
court rejected the simulation model exactly because it did not consider all relevant 
competitors and failed to include all the relevant products
41 – in other words, the results of the 
simulation model were rejected because of a precedent inadequate market delineation! In fact, 
experience from the US shows that this is a more general problem.
42
Despite unilateral effects analysis, in theory, downplays the importance of accurate and exact 
market delineation, practical merger control policy is ill-advised to take market definition 
easy. An inaccurate delineation of the relevant market represents a good and easy target for 
raising doubts on the adequacy of the presented economic evidence in the courtroom. In 
particular, shadows of doubt can be cast on the validity of the results of merger simulation 
models, allowing the opposition to completely discard the model. In consequence, the 
‘ambiguous’ and ‘arbitrary’ task of market definition remains an important ingredient of 
merger control.  
4.2.2. On the Nature of Predictive Economic Evidence 
Next to the preceding lesson, Oracle/PeopleSoft reveals two types of general problems with 
the use of sophisticated economic instruments as predictive, quantitative evidence. The crux 
with ex-ante merger control is that it requires to ‘look into the future’ – namely to predict 
post-merger price and output changes. However, in an indeterministic world, exact 
quantitative predictions of the future represent an a priori impossibility since the future is not 
encapsulated in the present. Furthermore, every model must significantly reduce the 
complexity of reality
43 (otherwise it is of no help
44). As a consequence, any particular merger 
simulation model is highly sensitive to the chosen assumptions (e.g. Walker 2005, 479-483; 
Werden  et  al.  2004, 14-21). Since it is impossible to comprehensively include realistic 
assumptions (i.e. no complexity reduction), a particular merger simulation model is generally 
subject to criticism regarding the adequacy of its assumptions. 
                                                 
41 The Court wrote: “Accordingly, because this merger simulation is based upon these unreliable data, the court 
concludes that the simulation results are likewise unreliable” (US, 151). 
42 Similarly, an economic model was rejected by an US court because of a deficient market delineation 
producing wrong market shares in Concord Boat vs. Brunswick Corp. (Walker 2005, 486-487). In another case, 
the merger between two of the three leading suppliers of computer disaster recovery services (SunGard Data 
Systems and Comdisco, in 2001), the DoJ suffered defeat before the court in an unilateral effects case and again 
the issue of market definition and the availability of substitute solutions played a crucial role (Gidley/Balto 
2002). 
43 See for example EU, para 193: “For models to be mathematically tractable it is necessary to make simplifying 
assumptions and in this process it is important to ensure that the essential mechanisms that are left in the model 
adequately reflect the reality.“ 
44 “A model which took account of all the variegation of reality would be of no more use than a map at the scale 
of one to one.” (Robinson 1962, 33). 24 
It is important to realise that neither aspect speaks against the use of simulation models and 
econometrics in merger control proceedings. However, exorbitant expectations and excessive 
demands on predictive economic evidence must be avoided. Economic tools are different 
from (foretime-oriented) natural science-evidence methods such as genetic fingerprints 
(identifying a concrete individual with 99.9 % certainty) and cannot quantify the future 
development of the relevant markets at comparable certainty levels. Instead, they can describe 
scenarios against the background of clearly defined and explicit assumptions. This insight 
yields a couple of implications: 
-  Generally, there is not only one ‘right’ model to describe a given merger. The 
inevitable necessity to simplify the actual case and the consequent possibility to 
produce competing models with (sometimes diametrical) differing results renders the 
consensual identification of the single ‘right’ model highly unlikely. The parties to the 
merger control procedure – the competition authorities, the merging enterprises, 
competitors of the merging enterprises – have differing interests and, thus, competing 
models with mutually incompatible predictions about the (pro- or anti-) competitive 
impact are likely to be produced and injected into the procedure.
45 Actually, in many 
merger control procedures, competing models were presented.
46 Diverging interests of 
the merging parties (due to its character as a hostile takeover) motivated in Oracle-
PeopleSoft even one of the parties to the merger – PeopleSoft – to provide economic 
evidence supporting the anticompetitive effects of the merger. Therefore, concurring 
simulations models producing divergent predictions are likely to be the rule instead of 
the exception. 
-  If the results of merger simulation models shall be used as evidence in the courtroom, 
the applicable standard of proof must be adjusted to the nature of predictive economic 
                                                 
45 Posner (1999, 1536-1538) refers to this as the problem of partisanship inherent in expert testimonies. 
However, even if no interests were involved, the simplifying character of all models can prevent an 
unambiguous identification of the best suited model. The complexity reduction of different models can refer to 
differing parameters of the real case, so that competing models can be equally distant to the real case – and, 
nevertheless, produce incompatible predictions about the (pro- or anti-) competitive impact. Arguing 
theoretically rigorous, in such an extreme case, it is impossible to identify the relatively best model – even in the 
(unrealistic) absence of distortions through interests. 
46 A prominent example is the GE/Honeywell merger of 2001, which provoked intense debates not only between 
the US and EU authorities but also among economists (e.g. Patterson/Shapiro 2001; Drauz 2002; 
Evans/Salinger 2002; Nalebuff 2002; Pflanz/Caffarra 2002; Reynolds/Ordover 2002; Gerber 2003; 
Morgan/McGuire  2004). The most prominent non-merger case is probably Microsoft, where numerous 
economic experts produced strongly differing evidence, almost covering the complete spectrum between pro- 
and anticompetitive effects (e.g. Bresnahan 2001; Fisher/Rubinfeld 2001; Gilbert/Katz 2001; Schmalensee 2001; 
Werden 2001; Evans/Nichols/Schmalensee 2005).  25 
evidence.
47 For instance, given its characteristics (simplifying models, contestable 
assumptions, imperfect foresight), a beyond reasonable doubt (i.e. certainty) standard 
is inappropriate, in particular in combination with a one-sided burden of proof 
allocation (since no model can mirror the real case to a waterproof extent). The 
inherent problems with the standard of proof in merger control were also highlighted 
by the CFI’s recent Impala Judgment
48 (also Aigner et al. 2006). 
-  Quantitative economic evidence needs to be accompanied by qualitative reasoning and 
‘traditional’ evidence. For instance, the econometric evidence presented by Oracle 
during an advanced phase of the merger control proceedings demonstrated that neither 
the participation of PeopleSoft, nor the number of bidders provided explanatory power 
for the amount of discounts granted by Oracle (see section 3.3). Apart from discussing 
the validity of the data and the explanatory adequacy of the econometric model
49, it 
would be interesting from an economic perspective, however, to discuss the 
implications for competition in these markets and Oracle’s position in it. In 
economics, it is not a trivial phenomenon that the number of competitors does not 
influence the price-setting behaviour of an oligopolist (ostensibly) without market 
power. Furthermore, what does it imply for the heterogeneity/homogeneity of the 
oligopoly that the identity of the bidding competitors is without significant influence? 
In addition, an overwhelming amount of (though more anecdotic) evidence from the 
witness testimonies stood in sharp contrast to the econometric insights.
50 As far as 
information is publicly available, neither of these questions has been discussed in 
order to appropriately interpret and assess the results of the econometrics. 
In summary, securing the considerable benefits of predictive economic evidence in merger 
control cases demands an adequate framework for their employment.
51 This particularly 
includes accompanying (‘traditional’) analysis and a realistic view on the capability and 
explanatory power of sophisticated economic instruments. 
                                                 
47 See for an elaborate and formal analysis of the interplay between standards of proof and predictive economic 
evidence against the background of Oracle/PeopleSoft Budzinski/Christiansen (2006). See more generally 
Botteman (2006), Lindsay (2006, 66-75) and Vesterdorf (2005). 
48 Case T-464/04, Impala v Commission, Judgment of the Court of First Instance, 13/07/2006. 
49 Since the respective information is confidential and not publicly available, a respective assessment cannot be 
made. Therefore, we assume that the econometric analysis is perfectly accurate. 
50 See section 3 of this paper and particularly Bengtsson (2005). 
51 A related aspect of securing the fruitful contribution of economics to competition policy enforcement concerns 
the adequate degree of differentiation both in the underlying rules and in case-specific analysis. As a general 
condition, the increasing costs of engaging in case-by-case economic analyses instead of relying on more general 
rules must be weighed against the improvement in decision quality. See in more detail Christiansen (2006, 30-
38) and, in particular, Christiansen/Kerber (2006). 26 
4.2.3. The Nature of Competition 
A second line of general problems lies in the nature of competition itself. Merger simulation 
models focus on short-term price and output effects. However, there is more to competition 
than these important effects. Competition represents a superior coordination mechanism for 
economic behaviour because it induces allocative efficiency (short-term welfare effects), 
innovative efficiency (long-term welfare effects), adaptive efficiency (keeping the economy 
flexible regarding changing environments; evolutionary welfare effects), consumer 
sovereignty (producers are induced to adjust their supply according to the preferences of the 
consumers), and contributes to economic freedom (liberal welfare effects) (Budzinski 2004, 
15-16).  Scheffman (2004) and Walker (2005, 487-488, 489-490) point out that non-
quantifiable and non-price elements of competition – like e.g. barriers to entry and exit, buyer 
power, brand, promotion and placement effects, shelf space competition, strategy effects 
on/of market participants, etc. – can hardly be included in merger simulation models since the 
available price-theoretic standard models (Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly competition; 
auction models) do not capture these dimensions of competition.
52 Furthermore, the dynamic 
and evolutionary dimension has to be taken into consideration. Competition is an evolutionary 
process of creative and adaptive (re-) actions, inherently dynamic and endogenously 
producing innovation. The innovation-generating dynamics of competition, which imply that 
the process of competition is not perfectly anticipatable, represent the core of competition 
theories in the legacy of Schumpeter.
53
Econometric evidence necessarily relies on past data. Merger simulation models, which are 
calibrated with past and present market data and stylised market facts (e.g. market shares; in 
Oracle-PeopleSoft among others also estimates on the frequency of unsuccessful bidding 
processes), implicitly assume that the patterns of competition in the respective market can be 
extrapolated from the past to the future. However, at the heart of Schumpeterian competition 
lies the creative character of competition, destructing hitherto existing patterns and creating 
new ones, generating innovation in a broad sense (encompassing new products, new processes 
and technologies, but also new modes of behaviour). Particularly a merger in a narrow 
oligopoly represents a profound change in the competitive environment. This considerably 
enhances the likelihood of ‘structural interruptions’, making extrapolations particularly 
problematic. For instance, in Oracle-PeopleSoft, the future role of Microsoft (either increasing 
its engagement in the high-function market or concentrating on alternative markets) 
represents one such factor, while the evolving technological requirements in this innovation-
                                                 
52 See also the Froeb/Scheffman/Werden (2004) debate.  
53 See e.g. Clark 1963; Kerber 1994; Metcalfe 1998; Langlois 2001; Budzinski 2003, 19-25; Kerber 2006. 27 
intensive market another one. To which extent does the econometric insight that PeopleSoft 
was no particular constraint on Oracle in the past imply that it will not be in the future (if the 
merger is blocked)? 
Schumpeterian and evolutionary competition theories emphasise the dynamics of competition 
and its innovation-generating character. Therefore, it becomes important that the markets 
remain open and prone to evolutionary dynamics (as opposed to sclerotic structures). The 
strengths of the economic techniques discussed in this paper refer to the important short-term 
price and output effects. The more long-term dynamic and evolutionary effects are much 
more difficult to predict quantitatively. However, they are equally important regarding the 
overall welfare effects. If longer-term, non-quantifiable effects are neglected, long-term 
welfare losses must be expected. 
Thus, dynamic and evolutionary competition economics should be included in the overall 
competitive assessment.
54 Qualitative aspects are as important as quantitative ones as the 
future is not determined and, thus, not perfectly predictable (the merger event itself can cause 
structural interruptions, etc.). Open markets and maintaining the adaptability and innovation 
capabilities of markets in the future represent targets of competition policy that are equally 
important as short-term efficiency effects in regard to overall, short- plus long-run welfare. A 
more systematic integration of evolutionary and dynamic competition economics could lead 
to the adoption of a principle of caution according to which in case of doubt (i.e. insecurity 
about the short-term effects) a primacy of the protection of agile competitive markets (and a 
frustration of paths to sustainable sclerotic, inelastic markets) is implemented. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Unilateral effects analysis represents an increasingly important part of contemporary merger 
control both in the US and the EU, particularly with regard to oligopolistic mergers. 
Competition economics has developed a number of sophisticated tools for practical 
application such as econometric analyses of market data as well as the construction of 
simulation models in order to quantify the case-specific effects. The review of the merger 
between software firms Oracle and PeopleSoft in 2003/04 has been the most important 
instance of parallel application of the simulation technique by the European Commission and 
the US Department of Justice so far. The in-depth study of the case going from the 
controversial issue of market definition to the specificities of the competitive assessment 
highlights more similarities than differences between the EU and US. Interestingly, despite 
                                                 
54 For first approaches and comparable suggestions, albeit for different areas of competition policy, see e.g. 
Audretsch et al. 2001; Kerber/Vezzosso 2005; Langlois 2001; Budzinski 2004. 28 
serious initial concerns the transaction was not blocked nor even required to be modified in 
the any of the two jurisdictions. We derive a number of interesting insights and, in particular, 
point out problems and lessons associated with the use of sophisticated economic tools in 
contemporary merger control. In addition to case-specific factors, the major insights 
encompass the continued relevance of market definition, the need to accompany predictive 
economic evidence with compatible reasoning and the benefits of including the economics of 
dynamic and evolutionary competition. 
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